Labour Mobility Options as Adaptation Strategies to Environmental Changes? by Fornalé, Elisa
 1 
Labour Mobility Options as Adaptation Strategies to Environmental 
Changes? 
Elisa Fornalé
1
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The international community has devoted a substantial effort to understanding the concrete 
impact of environmental degradation (defined as slow-onset environmental degradation, such 
as rising sea levels, increased salinization, desertification, and soil or coastal erosion) on 
human mobility and to fostering research to identify migration, in particular labour mobility, 
as a positive adaptation strategy.
2
 For example, the latest report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) focuses for the first time on human mobility, noting that: 
 
climate change is projected to increase the displacement of people throughout this 
century. The risk of displacement increases when populations who lack the resources to 
migrate experience higher exposure to extreme weather events, in both rural and urban 
areas, particularly in low-income developing countries. Changes in migration patterns 
can be responses to both extreme weather events and longer-term climate variability and 
change, and migration can also be an effective adaptation strategy.
3
 
 
In line with this statement, a major achievement of the 2012 Conference of the Parties to the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (COP 18) was the adoption of 
paragraph 7(a)(vi) of the Draft decision -/CP.18, which links migration and the emerging 
issue of ‘loss and damage’ by acknowledging the need for further research and work towards 
‘enhancing the understanding of: […] How impacts of climate change are affecting patterns 
of migration, displacement and human mobility.’4 More recently, the adoption of the Paris 
Agreement in December 2015 established the creation of a new mechanism, the Task Force 
on Displacement, to ‘develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimise 
and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change.’5 Over the course 
of the next two years, this Task Force will elaborate and identify innovative measures to 
address the impact of climate change, in particular human mobility from affected countries. 
 
Equally, the outcomes of the Nansen Initiative’s6 consultations in the Pacific, Central 
America, and the Greater Horn of Africa focused on the migration-environment nexus and 
reflect the scientific consensus regarding its reality, urgency and significance.
7
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Initiative’s Protection Agenda, adopted in October 2015, highlights several legal gaps related 
to cross-border displacement in the context of disasters linked to natural hazards, including 
critical issues such as ‘admission, basic rights during the temporary or permanent stay, and 
conditions for return.’8 
 
The European Commission has further situated the discussion within the context of migration 
law, as well as international law, suggesting that ‘facilitating well-managed mobility and 
labour mobility from environmentally degraded areas can represent an effective strategy to 
reduce environmentally-induced displacement.’9 Likewise, the Advisory Group on Climate 
Change and Human Mobility (hereinafter Advisory Group) has noted that ‘voluntary 
migration, whether circular, temporary, or permanent, can be potentially positive form of 
adaptation to climate change.’10 Although it is a global problem, the impact of climate change 
on human mobility will not be uniform within countries, and therefore it may be relevant to 
explore and identify different ‘entry points’ with a view to formulating appropriate and 
flexible strategies.
11
 
 
In this regard, this chapter examines the potential of existing mobility options for reducing 
the vulnerability of affected communities by strengthening the nexus between human 
mobility regimes and climate-change related policies. In the past decade, a growing body of 
literature
12
 has contributed to a broader conceptualisation of mobility by welcoming the idea 
that migration can be a legitimate ‘adaptation strategy.’13 In this context, the emerging debate 
on the environmental migration nexus relies on economic development and labour markets to 
foster resilience.
14
 Drawing from this approach, the chapter analyses the potential of existing 
avenues and tools which are available to facilitate mobility. The focus of the analysis will be 
on the case study of the Pacific Island Countries and the negotiations which have taken place 
in the context of trade-related measures to expand labour mobility channels. It appears crucial 
to explore what added value the progressive liberalisation of the temporary movement of 
natural persons as service suppliers can have for affected nations as a measure that can be 
used to complement traditional avenues of migration policy. 
 
2. Environmental Degradation and Mobility Strategies 
 
Slow-onset environmental degradation may generate diverse migratory outcomes: in some 
cases forced migration may occur for survival, whereas in others voluntary migration may be 
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an efficient adaptation strategy.
15
 In particular, the estimates of actual and expected flows as a 
result of slow-onset environmental changes suggest that the pressure towards labour mobility 
across countries will increase.
16
 
 
It is undisputed that individuals displaced across international borders as a result of 
environmental changes are especially vulnerable to human and economic losses and 
impacts,
17
 as well as to numerous protection and institutional gaps that arise because they do 
not have access to the same legal protection as other vulnerable groups.
18
 The Advisory 
Group recognises that ‘migration can be a positive and survival strategy’ and that there is a 
potential to improve the ‘adaptive capacity’ of affected communities by developing ‘context-
specific solutions.’19 Thus, facilitating and increasing labour mobility options can 
complement and support unilateral initiatives developed by states, on their own or as a 
group.
20
 
 
In this regard, Bettini et al highlight how the emerging discourse on the understanding of 
‘migration as adaptation’ has to be re-oriented with regard to labour mobility to further 
explore the increasing potential to develop ‘individualised’ adaptation processes.21 In their 
analysis, they argue that the relationship between climate change and migration will 
contribute to shifting rights, duties and state responsibility regarding economic development 
and delegating responsibility to the labour market.
22
 In this new context they describe how 
the discourse around individual agency highlights that by securing access to the labour 
market, migrants increase their resilience. Conversely, the role of the state and international 
community is ‘to govern the movement of labour migrants in order for them to undertake 
adaptation measures and secure themselves.’23 In other words, the current debate provides an 
interpretation of ‘migration as adaptation’ that will no longer identify migrants as victims of 
environmental degradation but as ‘agents of adaptation.’24 Such an interpretation can help to 
understand how existing mobility regimes become strategic in their adaptation process.
25
 
 
To complement this analysis, the aim of this chapter is therefore to explore the positive 
implications of conceiving migrants as a form of ‘mobile labour power’26 and how existing 
instruments can be reconfigured to ensure that mobility regimes positively foster resilience 
and so indirectly protect human rights.
27
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3. Human Mobility and Adaptation in the Pacific 
 
As part of this debate, the Pacific Island Countries (PICs)
28
 are becoming aware that they 
need to explore sustainable solutions to deal with issues linked with environmental 
degradation, such as increased unemployment.
29
 This is the case for instance for Kiribati and 
Tuvalu, which are particularly ‘affected by climate change, and which cannot rely on 
domestic industries.’30 Eberhard has emphasized that migration strategies have been widely 
and traditionally used by the citizens of low-lying states and, rather than focusing on 
statelessness, the contemporary debate needs to focus on how to remove obstacles for the 
legal admission of citizens of affected states to countries of destination, and how to secure 
their acceptance and integration in these countries.
31
 
 
Moreover, the implementation of different migration schemes may play a relevant role in 
preventing forced displacement and in promoting voluntary movement from at-risk areas.
32
 
As discussed further in this chapter, there is now a pluralised normative framework of labour 
mobility negotiations in the Pacific. The PICs are implementing and negotiating labour 
migratory instruments at the bilateral, regional and multilateral level and the following 
analysis will discuss the relevance of these instruments for individual countries.
33
 As recently 
stated by Kagan, ‘not all Pacific island countries are created equal when it comes to 
employment creation. Some countries have natural resources that can drive respectable 
employment growth. Some have the right climate and conditions to attract tourists, even 
within a niche tourism market. Others have colonial connections that ensure some level of 
migration or trade with Australia, New Zealand and the US.’34 
 
In addition, some countries such as Kiribati recognise the need to enhance growth in 
entrepreneurial development of human capital to ensure that their citizens have the 
appropriate skills to contribute to the economy of their potential country of destination.
35
 The 
lack of adequate investment in skills development or qualifications may also affect the equal 
access of Pacific Islanders to different countries and labour markets.
36
 
 
a. Overview of Existing Labour Mobility Programmes 
 
Contemporary cross-border migration exhibits three main trends: i) from PICs to countries of 
the Pacific Rim (e.g. New Zealand and Australia); ii) migratory flows between New Zealand 
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and Australia; and iii) intra-regional mobility between PICs.
37
 Migration has played a 
relevant role throughout the history of the Pacific region and it has taken many different 
forms but, as emphasized by Kagan, ‘labour migration management remains under-
developed’ and the improvement of migration management has been identified as a regional 
and global goal to ensure decent work for migrants.
38
 
 
This section highlights some of the main concerns and challenges to developing successful 
mobility programmes, and considers whether current mobility programmes can be adjusted to 
allow people affected by natural disasters, including environmental degradation, to move 
voluntarily from the affected settings. 
 
First of all, there is a growing migration jigsaw formed by the different programmes and 
schemes in place, which can result in a fragmented normative environment and which can 
make the migration opportunities for citizens of PICs very different and unequal. Most of the 
existing migration schemes take the form of unilateral and voluntary commitments, meaning 
that ‘migrant-receiving governments establish rules that employers must follow in order to 
receive permission to have legal foreign workers admitted.’39 In these frameworks employers 
are gaining more and more control over administration of the schemes by asserting or 
attesting their need for foreign workers. In addition, as noted by Martin, these temporary or 
guest foreign worker programmes aim at rotating temporary workers in and out of the 
countries of destination without adding permanent residents to the population.
40
 In this 
context, the migration agreements developed by PICs with their neighbours, New Zealand 
and Australia, are of particular interest. 
 
In 2007, New Zealand started the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) programme that 
allowed the temporary entry of up to 8,000 persons annually to work in seasonal agricultural 
jobs. As stated by the New Zealand Department of Labour, one main objective of this 
programme was to ‘encourage economic development, regional integration and good 
governance within the Pacific, by allowing preferential access to workers who are citizens of 
eligible Pacific countries.’41 According to the World Bank, 24,600 workers have participated 
in this scheme, ‘more than half of workers returned at least once, and 23 per cent of workers 
have participated in all seasons.’42 Eligibility to this scheme is open to all countries, even if 
there is a Pacific preference. As remarked by Burson and Bedford, according to this scheme 
‘workers need to be recruited by New Zealand employers and the scheme is completely 
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demand-driven.’43 Recently, New Zealand decided to increase the annual cap from 8,000 to 
9,500 people and this can be explained as a direct effect of the entry of Fiji into the RSE 
programme and of the impact of the PACER Plus negotiations, which will be discussed 
below. The percentage of Pacific workers recruited under this scheme increased from 74 per 
cent in 2009-10 to 85 per cent in 2014-15.
44
 
 
In 2012, Australia started the Seasonal Worker Programme (SWP) in the horticultural sector 
after the completion of the Pacific Island Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme (PSWPS).
45
 At first, 
2,500 visas, and subsequently 3,250 visas, were made available for citizens from Papua New 
Guinea, Kiribati, Vanuatu, Tonga, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Timor Leste for 
un-skilled temporary work, mainly in the horticultural industry.
46
 Participation in this scheme 
is exclusive to PICs citizens, with the addition of the Cook Islands and Niue who have 
automatic entry to New Zealand, as well as three Micronesian Forum Island Countries which 
have entered into free association with the United States. 
 
In 2002, an interesting study designed by the World Bank with the New Zealand Department 
of Labour and the University of Waikato raised some specific concerns about how the RSE 
operates in practice.
47
 In particular, the survey highlighted a poor knowledge of the specific 
conditions of the temporary programmes, for example, about the obligations of employers. 
This concern has also been raised by the study conducted on the application of temporary 
schemes elaborated by Australia in which Hay and Howes identified a poor knowledge of 
these schemes.
48
 In addition, available data have revealed increasing obstacles to 
implementing these schemes for technical reasons. For instance, high transportation costs 
from specific Islands such as Vanuatu or Kiribati, may affect their citizens’ ability to fully 
benefit from such schemes. 
 
Speaking at the workshop attended by Pacific labour and trade officials in 2014, officials 
from the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment of New Zealand indicated that 
RSE is resource-intensive and costly and it would not be easy to extend it to other sectors.
49
 
For this reason, it was suggested that there is a need to explore additional labour mobility 
opportunities that could make a more significant contribution to combining the needs of the 
Pacific island countries and industry labour. 
 
Following on from this, significant progress has been registered by the Government of 
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Australia, which adopted a White Paper in 2015 to remove existing caps on the number of 
migrant workers involved in temporary mobility schemes.
50
 This instrument builds on the 
reforms to expand Australia’s SWP, recently announced by the government. In particular, 
from 1
st
 July 2015, Australia removed the national cap on the number of workers 
participating in the SWP. Access to this scheme is granted to all PICs, including the northern 
Pacific countries, Niue and the Cook Islands. Second, the White Paper proposed the 
establishment of a five-year pilot programme for 250 workers from Kiribati, Nauru and 
Tuvalu (around 50 workers per year). This five-year pilot programme will introduce a multi-
year work visa to work in non-seasonal industries and occupations in Northern Australia. 
 
With respect to the potential of these temporary programmes to deal with environmentally-
induced migration, it seems unlikely that such schemes provide the solution. The migratory 
challenges posed by these schemes are ‘completely demand-driven.’ There is no option in 
place for a potential Pacific worker to apply independently under one of these schemes; he or 
she has to be recruited by an employer.
51
 Also relevant is the absence of any option to 
transfer from temporary to long-term migration status in the country of destination. In this 
regard, the main countries of destination, such as Australia, could agree to foster labour 
mobility beyond the SWP, for instance by introducing a Pacific Access Quota, as proposed 
by the World Bank.
52
 The Pacific Access Category, adopted by New Zealand, reserves a 
special quota for citizens from small island states (including their partners and children) to 
encourage permanent labour mobility to New Zealand.
53
 
 
b. The Coverage of Temporary Movement of Natural Persons by Trade 
Agreements 
 
Since 1981, PICs have been involved in trade negotiations at the bilateral, regional and 
multilateral level.
54
 However, only recently has the issue of labour mobility begun to gain 
increasing relevance in the trade in services negotiation process. In fact, PICs are trying to 
increase and diversify the mobility options of their citizens by including specific coverage of 
‘temporary movement of natural persons’ in a variety of trade agreements.55 This option 
could increase the number of opportunities available to cope with some of the impacts of 
climate change that are already happening. Even if no formal linkages are made between 
labour mobility and environmental degradation, such an agreement might provide a starting 
point for responding to mobility induced by environmental changes in the Pacific. 
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As explained above, seasonal mobility schemes implemented by countries of destination, 
such as Australia and New Zealand, are limited. As highlighted by the Pacific Islands’ Chief 
Trade Negotiator, Dr Edwini Kessie, the Pacific Islands are making specific demands to first 
increase the annual caps, and then extend these schemes to other occupations (e.g. care of the 
elderly, trade occupations, mining, seafaring, tourism).
56
 
 
Of great relevance in this context was the negotiation process for the adoption of the Pacific 
Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER Plus) between the PICs and Australia and 
New Zealand. The PICs identified labour mobility as a key priority.
57
 As argued by the 
Office of the Chief Trade Adviser (OCTA) ‘due to the economic differences between the 
parties and the fact that FICs (Forum Island Countries) stood to gain very little, if at all, from 
their liberalisation commitments in trade in goods, services and investment, PACER Plus had 
to contain substantive commitments on labour mobility and development assistance.’58 
Edwini Kessie has noted that to address the concerns raised by the Government of Fiji: ‘Both 
Australia and New Zealand have undertaken commitments which should facilitate the 
movement of skilled and semi-skilled workers in the PACER Plus area.’59 The OCTA 
subsequently made a presentation in June 2016 during the Sixth Non-state Actors dialogue on 
the current status of PACER Plus negotiations with a focus on labour mobility to reiterate the 
potential of this process to reach reciprocal advantages and to facilitate the adoption of new 
forms of labour mobility.
60
 
 
Indeed, as highlighted by Oxfam, a key element for PICs regarding labour mobility for 
migrant workers under PACER Plus was the inclusion of binding obligations that will 
prevent Australia or New Zealand from unilaterally terminating these arrangements as could 
be the case for seasonal schemes. In fact as highlighted by Kelsey, ‘existing commitments on 
mode 4 and labour mobility show there are very limited precedents for binding and 
enforceable rights of access from the Pacific Islands, and none for workers with low skills or 
education.’61 
 
A key question during the negotiations was whether the coverage of temporary movement of 
natural persons would include labour mobility for unskilled workers. Even if formal 
commitments under Mode 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in free 
trade agreements (FTAs) are traditionally confined to categories of high-skilled services 
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suppliers, there are some interesting precedents in recent FTAs concluded by Australia and 
New Zealand. In particular the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-Australia-
New Zealand FTA (2010) which incorporates semi-skilled and technical workers by 
including the category of ‘installers and services.’62 
 
Furthermore, an interesting model is provided by the China-New Zealand FTA (2008) where 
commitments on temporary movement are contained in two separate annexes: the Annex on 
Temporary Employment Entry of Natural Persons and the Annex on Temporary Movement 
of Natural Persons, which provide opportunities to enter New Zealand for employment 
purposes in addition to the opportunities provided under New Zealand’s immigration 
policy.
63
 In this agreement, categories of service suppliers include semi-skilled workers as 
well as skilled workers. Even if there is no agreed definition of this distinction, it is important 
for PICs to ensure that access to New Zealand and Australia’s labour markets is not only 
offered to skilled migrants but also to lower skilled service providers. 
 
The coverage of the temporary movement of natural persons has also been included in the 
negotiations of the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement – Trade in Services to increase 
labour mobility and skills transfer in the region (PICTA TIS). PICs agreed to draft and adopt 
a protocol for the temporary movement of natural persons (TMNP Protocol) which was 
opened for signature in 2012.
64
 This protocol covers the temporary mobility of highly skilled 
(Tier 1) and skilled and semi-skilled workers (Tier 2) with temporary employment for up to 
three years.
65
 As argued by the Observatory on Migration (ACP), this regulatory framework 
has the potential to increase circular mobility in the region by contributing to the 
establishment of a single regional labour market.
66
 Migration patterns will therefore be 
impacted both by the use of this agreement to reduce barriers to free movement in the region 
and by turning vulnerable populations into agents of development in their area of origin.
67
 
This agreement could thus assist in reducing vulnerability and enhancing the adaptive 
capacity of those faced with environmental degradation. 
 
Nevertheless, as highlighted by the Report of the ACP Observatory on Migration, this 
scheme does not provide a comprehensive response to the ‘protection gaps’ raised by 
environmental-induced migration. First, this model can facilitate the temporary mobility of 
skilled migrants but it cannot be converted into permanent residence. Second, the TMNP 
Protocol attempts to address social security issues, but additional steps need to be taken at the 
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bilateral level to draft and implement social security regimes. Finally, this scheme requires 
both the country of origin and the country of destination to play an active role and many 
countries of origin have no provisions in place to deal with mobility of skilled labour. In 
addition, the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat recommends the inclusion in PICTA of the 
provisions and standards available at the international level to protect migrant workers’ rights 
under the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention and the United Nations 
Convention on Migrant Workers and Member of Their Families.
68
 
 
Finally, to conclude this overview, it is significant to recall that in 1993 the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group (MSG)
69
 adopted a regional trade agreement. This was followed in 2012 by 
the Skills Movement Scheme (SMS) Memorandum of Understanding, which covered the 
mobility of skilled workers. The purpose of the SMS is to: 
 
 strengthen regional cooperation and integration by providing access to employment 
opportunities and to facilitate the movement of Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) 
nationals among the Parties;  
 ensure and promote decent work practices amongst the Parties, and;  
 bring mutual benefits to the Parties by the movement of skilled nationals.70 
 
This instrument has been recognised as the first ‘intra-regional mobility scheme,’71 and 
allows up to 400 citizens of committed members to temporarily move to another member 
state for work reasons.
72
 Even if its relevance in the region has been defined as more 
‘symbolic than substantive’ because of its low impact, it can be used as a frame of reference 
to improve the architecture of labour mobility at the inter-regional level and to meet skill 
shortages. 
 
The Melanesian Spearhead Group Skills Movement Scheme’s Memorandum of 
Understanding contains some inspiring provisions. Clause 6.2 of the MOU requires Parties to 
develop and adopt transparent, reasonable and impartial criteria for its implementation. A 
specific provision, Clause 9.11, calls for implementation of the principle of non-
discrimination in facilitating the entry and the stay of migrant workers. Clauses 12.1-2 
require each party to apply international human rights and labour protection standards. 
Finally, spouses of migrant workers have a right to work in the same country in their specific 
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occupation, according to national law. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This analysis has provided a brief introduction to existing migration agreements in the Pacific 
region to explore the potential of migration as adaptation strategy to gradually respond to 
environmental degradation. Concentrating on the mobility schemes developed by small island 
states, this chapter shows a clear lack of comprehensive instruments able to provide specific 
responses in this context. The normative scenario is highly fragmented and the current 
migration programmes will need to be revised to address some persisting limits that risk 
impeding the mobility of potential environmental migrants. Temporary mobility schemes, 
such as seasonal programmes, remain the most widely adopted schemes for facilitating labour 
mobility, but challenges persist in consolidating them with Australia and New Zealand and to 
translate them into binding agreements. For instance, the mechanisms in place will benefit 
from the progressive flexibility in allocating quotas, as in the case of the new programme 
launched by the Government of Australia. The core rationale of these schemes is to rotate 
foreign workers in and out to fill vacant jobs without allowing these workers to become ‘free 
agents’ in the labour market, and this is a major factor in the inadequacy of these instruments 
to increase adaptation efforts of affected population. In fact, the schemes in place show how 
employers have made decisions on how and whether to recruit migrants beyond a country’s 
borders. 
 
In addition, the focus on labour mobility in the PACER Plus negotiations, together with the 
TMNP Protocol, may provide an effective framework to foster the mobility of skilled service 
providers across the region. If the limitation on expanding the cross-border mobility of less 
skilled workers within the PACER Plus negotiations remains, this will require the design 
alternative specific new migratory mechanisms. Given the persisting challenges of existing 
mechanisms to absorb environmentally-induced mobility, a key element in re-tooling or 
designing migratory schemes is to ensure that in the future the concerns and priorities of 
affected populations will gain a prominent role in the development of the international 
agenda. 
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